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L Introduction
According to a research study authorized by the United States Conference
of Catholic Bishops, a total of 4392 Catholic priests faced allegations of sexual
abuse of a minor between 1950 and 2002.1 The epidemic of clergy sexual
abuse has resulted in a torrent of litigation, with victims filing lawsuits against
both the accused clerics 2 and the religious organizations employing these
clerics.3 Plaintiffs in these lawsuits have asserted several theories of liability
against religious employers, including negligent hiring, negligent supervision,
and negligent retention. 4 A common thread among each of these causes of
action is a requirement that the plaintiff show that the employer was at fault. A
plaintiff who lacks evidence of employer fault cannot succeed under these
theories of liability, and the victim's lawsuit is instead confined to an action
against the offending cleric. In cases involving religious organizations that
require their clerics to take a vow of poverty,5 the victim's recovery is
effectively precluded in light of the judgment-proof offender.
1. THE JOHN JAY COLLEGE RESEARCH TEAM, THE NATURE AND SCOPE OFTHE PROBLEM OF
SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DEACONS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2004),

availableat http://www.usccb.org/nrb/johnjaystudy/.
2. The terms clerics, clergymen, and priests are used interchangeably in this Note. These
terms are used to denote an employee of a religious institution whose duties are to instruct
followers in the teachings of the religion and to perform religious services on behalf of the
institution. Similarly, the term parishioner is used to denote a member of a religious
organization. There is no intention to single out any one religious organization, as the argument
set forth in this Note is applicable to all hierarchical religious institutions.
3. See Janna Satz Nugent, A HigherAuthority: The Viability ofThird PartyTort Actions
Against a Religious Institution Groundedon Sexual Misconduct by a Member of the Clergy,30
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 957,961 (2003) ("[lit has become increasingly common for plaintiffs to sue
religious organizations for their clerics' misconduct.").
4. See id. (noting common causes of action asserted against religious organizations in
cases involving clergy sexual misconduct).
5.

See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK

152 (2004) (noting that the Roman Catholic Church requires its priests to take a vow of poverty
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Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for an
employee's tortious conduct "if the employee was acting within scope of
employment.' 6 Respondeat superior claims differ significantly from negligence
claims in that under respondeat superior "an employer is liable, despite having
no fault whatsoever, for the acts of its employees taken within the scope of their
employment. ,7 The basic rationale for imposing this type of vicarious liability
is that employers subjected to such a rigid standard of liability will exercise
greater care in selecting their employees. 8 In theory, the more stringent hiring
standard will result in businesses hiring employees who are less prone to
tortious conduct.
In general, courts are reluctant to find respondeat superior liability in cases
of intentional torts. 9 In matters of intentional torts involving sexual
misconduct, one court has stated as a matter of law that "when the tortfeaseremployee's [sic] activity with the alleged victim became sexual, the employee
abandoned and ceased to further the employer's business."' 10 In Tichenor v.
Archdiocese ofNew Orleans,1 the Fifth Circuit articulated a common judicial
and to give all personal earnings to the order), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ocos
063.pdf.
6. Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Or. 1999); see also Fargher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793 (1998) ("A 'master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment."' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF
AGENCY § 219(1) (1958))).
7. Hamilton v. Carell, 243 F.3d 992, 1001 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 14 (1991) (noting that respondeat superior involves "[i]mposing
liability [on an employer] without independent fault"); Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814
P.2d 1341, 1343 (Cal. 1991) ("[Respondeat superior] is a departure from the general tort
principle that liability is based on fault.").
8. See Tippecanoe Beverages, Inc. v. S.A. El Aguila Brewing Co., 833 F.2d 633, 638
(7th Cir. 1987) (noting that the policy behind the doctrine of respondeat superior is "that of
encouraging employers and other principals to select their employees and other agents
carefully").
9. See, e.g., Borneman v. United States, 213 F.3d 819, 828 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[U]nder the
North Carolina law of respondeatsuperior,an intentional tort is 'rarely considered to be within
the scope of an employee's employment."' (quoting Meslin v. Bass, 398 S.E.2d 460,464 (N.C.
1990))).
10. Reynolds v. Zizka, CV9505552225, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 619, at *8 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 1998) (citing Gutieerez v. Thorne, 537 A.2d 527 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988)).
But see Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 309 F. Supp. 2d 247, 252 (D. Conn.
2004) (denying Archdiocese's motion to dismiss plaintiff's respondeat superior claim where the
alleged sexual abuse took place during counseling sessions designed to bring the plaintiff closer
to the church and thereby increase financial donations to the church).
11. Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church Archdiocese of New Orleans, 32 F.3d 953 (5th
Cir. 1994). In Tichenor, the petitioner claimed that he was molested by a priest employed by
the Archdiocese of New Orleans. Id. at 957. The petitioner appealed a district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the archdiocese on the issue of respondeat superior. Id. at 959.
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reaction to a claim of respondeat superior against a religious institution based
upon sexual misconduct, stating that "[i]t would be hard to imagine a more
difficult argument than that [a priest's] illicit sexual pursuits were somehow
related to his duties as a priest or that they in any way furthered the interests
of... his employer." 12 Common sense dictates that a cleric's duties are to help
others understand and follow religious teachings.13 Sexual conduct of any kind,
4
specifically sexual abuse, could hardly be considered to fulfill this duty.'
But one jurisdiction has recognized the validity of respondeat superior
claims asserted against religious organizations in cases involving clergy sexual
misconduct. 15 In Fearingv. Bucher,16 the Oregon Supreme Court addressed
the adequacy of a plaintiffs claim of respondeat superior against the

The court discussed the priest's alleged conduct in light of his duties as a priest and an
employee of the diocese. Id. Rejecting the petitioner's claim that the alleged sexual abuse was
within the scope of the priest's employment, the court cited the priest's vow of celibacy and the
Catholic Church's condemnation of homosexual relations as evidence that the priest's actions
did not further the interests of his employer. Id. at 960. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the diocese on the issue of respondeat superior.
Id.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 959 (finding that a priest's duties include representing the word of God,
aiding people in their relationship with God, and generally helping others).
14. See id. at 960 (noting a Catholic priest's vow of celibacy as evidence supporting the
court's conclusion that the alleged sexual misconduct was outside of the priest's scope of
employment); Hayes v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, X07CV020084286S, 2004 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 2440, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24,2004) ("Unlike a situation where a servant
performs the master's work poorly or misunderstands what the master wants done, the
molestation of children is a total abdication of the master's work so that the pedophile priest can
satisfy personal lust.").
15. See Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1167 (Or. 1999) (holding that petitioner's
complaint alleged sufficient facts to establish a claim of respondeat superior).
16. Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163 (Or. 1999). In Fearing,the petitioner alleged
sexual molestation by a priest employed by the Archdiocese of Portland. Id. at 1164. The
Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, based in
part on the conclusion that the complaint failed to allege facts "from which it could be
reasonably concluded that Bucher's sexual assaults on plaintiff were within the scope of
Bucher's employment." Id. The Supreme Court of Oregon determined that the court of appeals
did not apply the proper scope-of-employment inquiry. Id. at 1167. The proper inquiry should
focus on whether "the sexual assaults were the culmination of a progressive series of actions that
began with and continued to involve Bucher's performance of the ordinary and authorized
duties of a priest." Id. In light of the plaintiff s allegations that Bucher abused his authority as a
priest to gain the opportunity to commit the assaults, that court held that the complaint alleged
facts sufficient to survive the Archdiocese's motion to dismiss. Id. The case was later settled
out of court. Ashbel S. Green, Oregon Clergy Flooded With Suits, OREGONIAN, July 7,2002, at
A01, availableat http://www.oregonlive.com/special/priest/index.ssf?/special/oregonian/priest
020707.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Archdiocese of Portland. 17 The Fearing court stated that intentional torts,
including sexual assault, require a somewhat different respondeat superior
analysis.' 8 Rather than asking whether the sexual assault itself was within the
scope of employment, the court instead inquired as to whether the priest's
conduct leading up to the assault was within the scope of employment. 19 In so
doing, the court considered the nature of the relationship between the priest and
the plaintiff, including the plaintiff's allegations that the priest abused his
clerical authority and manipulated the plaintiff's trust in order to gain the
opportunity to commit the sexual assaults. 20 The court determined that a
reasonable jury could conclude that the priest's legitimate actions preceding the
abuse were "a necessary precursor to the sexual abuse" and that the sexual
assaults therefore "were a direct outgrowth of and were engendered by conduct
that was within the scope of [the priest's] employment. ''21 In the opinion of the
court, the issue of whether the sexual misconduct was within the priest's scope
of employment was a question of fact to be determined by the jury.22
The failure of religious institutions to effectively address the crisis of
clergy sexual abuse warrants a reexamination of the doctrine of respondeat
superior as applied to hierarchical religious institutions in matters involving
clergy sexual abuse. This Note argues that the analysis employed by the
Oregon Supreme Court in Fearingv. Bucher is the proper respondeat superior
analysis in all cases involving intentional torts, including sexual assault.
Second, this Note contends that the inherent power imbalance between priest
and parishioner renders the relationship extraordinarily susceptible to
manipulation, which leads to a presumption that the required causal nexus
between the employment and resulting harm is satisfied in clergy sexual
misconduct cases. When a plaintiff is able to allege sufficient facts showing
that the priest used his clerical authority to take advantage of the plaintiffs
vulnerability and commit sexual assaults upon the plaintiff, courts should
recognize the validity of a plaintiff's respondeat superior claim and allow the
17. See Fearing, 977 P.2d at 1165-68 (discussing the sufficiency of the petitioner's
complaint in alleging a claim of respondeat superior).
18. See id. at 1167 (stating that in the context of intentional torts, a proper respondeat
superior analysis must ask whether the tortfeasor's conduct that led to the injury was within the
scope of employment, rather than whether the intentional tort itself was within the scope of
employment).
19. See id. at 1168 (analyzing the defendant's conduct preceding the petitioner's injuries).
20. See id. (discussing the causal nexus between the employment and the sexual assault in
light of the plaintiff's allegations that the priest used his authority to gain the plaintiff's trust and
thereby gain the opportunity to commit the assaults).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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jury to determine whether the defendant was acting within the scope of
employment when the sexual misconduct occurred. By applying this standard
of vicarious liability, the judicial system will take a major step toward holding
these organizations accountable for the actions of their employees. Increased
liability will result in greater assurance of compensation for victims of clergy
sexual misconduct, more demanding selection and monitoring standards, and
reduced incidents of clergy sexual abuse.
Part II of the Note discusses a significant threshold issue, the doctrine of
Ecclesiastical Abstention, and analyzes a religious institution's ability to seek
shelter behind the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. More specifically, Part II examines the viability of
respondeat superior claims under the Ecclesiastical Abstention doctrine and
determines that respondeat superior claims are less burdensome to the
principles of religious autonomy than those grounded in negligence. Part El
discusses the doctrine of respondeat superior as applied to intentional torts,
particularly in the context of sexual assault, and compares the Fearinganalysis
to approaches taken by other jurisdictions. Part IV addresses the nature of the
relationship between a cleric and parishioner, focusing on the vulnerability of
the parishioner and the power of the cleric. Part IV also discusses other
relationships involving dominant and vulnerable parties, such as the therapistpatient relationship, and explores the impact these relationships have on the
applicability of respondeat superior. Furthermore, Part IV discusses the
church-mandated "vow of poverty" taken by Roman Catholic priests in light of
the policy concerns behind respondeat superior liability. Finally, Part V
concludes that courts should employ the Fearing analysis when evaluating
respondeat superior claims arising out of intentional torts. Part V further
concludes that courts should recognize the validity of respondeat superior
claims in cases of clergy sexual misconduct in order to provide both an
effective method of compensating victims of sexual abuse and a strong
incentive for religious organizations to exercise greater care in selecting and
supervising employees.
II. The Doctrine of EcclesiasticalAbstention
A. Introduction to the Doctrine
The doctrine of Ecclesiastical Abstention is a significant threshold issue
that one must address when analyzing any legal claims levied against religious
institutions. Courts interpret the doctrine as an outgrowth of both First
Amendment religious freedom clauses, the Free Exercise Clause, and the
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Establishment Clause.23 As articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Watson v. Jones,24 the doctrine states that questions of ecclesiastical rule,
church discipline, and theological controversy are "matter[s] over which the
civil courts exercise no jurisdiction. 25 Watson and its progeny instruct that the
First Amendment bars courts from deciding questions that require the
interpretation of ecclesiastical law.26 The doctrine's mandate of deference to
religious institutions protects these organizations in two distinct ways. First,
the Free Exercise prong of the doctrine protects religious organizations and
officials from being coerced into abiding by governmentally defined standards
of conduct. 2 Second, the Establishment Clause prong of the doctrine protects
the general population from government endorsement of the practices of any
particular religious organization.28
B. Smith Neutrality and the Free Exercise Clause
In Employment Division, Departmentof Human Resources of Oregon v.

Smith,29 the United States Supreme Court considered a Free Exercise claim
23. See Christopher R. Farrell, Note, EcclesiasticalAbstention and the Crisis in the
Catholic Church, 19 J.L. & POL. 109, 116 (2003) ("[Tlhe Court has been unclear as to the
precise textual source of the doctrine-i.e., whether the doctrine is a product of the Free
Exercise Clause or of the Establishment Clause.").
24. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872). Watson involved a dispute among members of
the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church of Louisville, Kentucky. Id. at 714. The trustees of the
church refused to recognize the validity of a church election that appointed several church elders
and granted the elders the power to exercise control over church property. Id. at 717. After
discussing the potential problems associated with judicial resolution of ecclesiastical disputes,
the Court determined that the controversy at hand did not implicate ecclesiastical rule and was
therefore justiciable. Id. at 734. The Court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the appellants
had no right to the church property. Id. at 735.
25. Id. at 733.
26. See Farrell, supra note 23, at 116 (discussing the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the doctrine of Ecclesiastical Abstention).
27. See id. at 131 (noting the ordainment of a priest as an example of a church decision
that is directly tied to canon law).
28. See id. at 133 (stating that judicial approval of a particular method of hiring might
amount to a governmental endorsement of a particular religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause).
29. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In
Smith, members of the Native American Church alleged a Free Exercise violation after the state
denied them unemployment benefits following their dismissal from employment for using
peyote. Id. at 874. The members of the church argued that although the law denying
unemployment benefits to individuals who were dismissed for using drugs was a generally
applicable law, the law was invalid because it was not justified by a compelling government
interest. Id. at 883. The Supreme Court rejected the compelling government interest standard,
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brought by members of the Native American Church who were denied
unemployment benefits after they were fired from their jobs for ingesting
peyote in a religious ceremony. 30 The church members argued that the law
disqualifying them from unemployment benefits because of their drug use
should be invalidated because it impeded their religious exercise and it did not
serve a compelling state interest. 3 1 The Court rejected the compellinggovernment-interest standard and upheld the law, stating that the
"government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially
harmful conduct.., cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental
action on a religious objector's spiritual development. 3 2 The decision in Smith
"rejected the argument that the [Free Exercise] clause mandated exemptions for
religiously motivated conduct in relation to generally applicable laws. , Read
in conjunction with the Supreme Court's opinion in Church of the Lukmi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,34 Smith established that although a law that
exclusively imposes a burden upon religious practice must be narrowly tailored
and serve a compelling government interest, an individual's religious beliefs
law. 35
cannot excuse him from failure to comply with a generally applicable
Congress swiftly responded to Smith by passing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).36

Purportedly enacted pursuant to the

Section 5 enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, 37 RFRA
stating that "[t]he government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially
harmful conduct... 'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a
religious objector's spiritual development."' Id. at 885 (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).
30. See id. at 874 (discussing church members' dismissals and disqualification for
unemployment benefits).
31. See id. at 882-83 (noting that the respondents sought a compelling government
interest standard for neutrally applicable laws that burden religious practices).
32. Id. at 885 (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451).
33. Farrell, supra note 23, at 122.
34. Church of the Lukmi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). In
Lukmi, practitioners of the Santeria religion sought to invalidate a city ordinance that prohibited
the killing or sacrifice of animals in any kind of ritual. Id. at 527. The Court noted both the
language of the ordinance, which used religious terms including "sacrifice" and "ritual," and the
legislative history of the ordinance, which evinced an intent to target practitioners of Santeria.
Id. at 534-37. Holding that the ordinance was not a neutral law under Smith, the Court applied
a compelling interest test and invalidated the ordinance. Id. at 542.
35. See Farrell, supranote 23, at 126 (stating that the Supreme Court created a bifurcated
analysis under which neutral laws are analyzed under the Smith framework but laws that target
religious practice are analyzed under Lukmi).
36. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000)).
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (authorizing Congress "to enforce, by appropriate
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explicitly abrogated the Supreme Court's holding in Smith and mandated the
compelling-government-interest test as the appropriate standard for determining
whether a neutrally applicable law violates the Free Exercise Clause.38 In City
of Boerne v. Flores,39 the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to consider
legislation, the provisions of this article").
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (2000) (stating that "the compelling interest test... is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior
governmental interests"). The relevant text of the law stated the following congressional
findings and purposes:
§ 2000bb. Congressional findings and declaration of purposes
(a) Findings: The Congress finds that(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion
as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment
to the Constitution;
(2) laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious exercise as
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise
without compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Supreme
Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government
justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward
religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings
is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing prior governmental interests.
(b)

Purposes. The purposes of this Chapter are(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free
exercise is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by government.

Id.
39. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In City of Boerne, the Archbishop of
San Antonio, Texas brought an action against the city of Boerne, Texas following the city's
denial of a building permit sought by the St. Peter Catholic Church. Id. at 512. The church
sought relief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), a federal law that provided
that a neutral state or federal law that burdens the free exercise of religion is invalid unless the
government can demonstrate that the law furthers a compelling government interest and that the
method chosen to further the interest is the least restrictive means of doing so. Id. at 515-16.
The Archbishop argued that the City of Boerne's Historical Landmark ordinance, under which
the church's permit was denied, violated RFRA. Id. at 512. The Fifth Circuit reversed the
ruling of the district court, which had denied the church's claim and had held that RFRA was an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. Id. In
reversing the Fifth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court found RFRA to be "a considerable
congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate
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the constitutionality of RFRA.4° Following a thorough analysis of the Free
Exercise Clause and congressional enforcement power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court determined that "RFRA contradicts
vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal
balance. ' ,4 1
By holding RFRA unconstitutional, City of Bourne
reestablished the Smith neutrality principle as the appropriate judicial
guideline for evaluating laws of general applicability under the Free
Exercise clause.42

C. Excessive Entanglement and the Establishment Clause
Although City of Boerne solidified the Smith neutrality principle, the
effect of this holding on the constitutionality of third-party tort actions
against religious institutions is unclear.4 3 Generally applicable tort claims
such as negligent hiring or negligent supervision are wholly unrelated toan
religious doctrine and are therefore neutral for purposes of Smith.
Nonetheless, some commentators argue that inquiring into the hiring or
supervision policies of religious institutions would require a secular
evaluation of religious practices that would violate the excessiveentanglement principle of the Ecclesiastical Abstention doctrine. 45 Even in
the wake of Smith neutrality, the excessive-entanglement principle, as
articulated by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York in Schmidt v. Bishop,46 remains at the heart of the doctrine of
for the health and welfare of their citizens." Id. at 534. The Court held RFRA an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Section 5 enforcement power that endangered principles
of separation of powers and federal balance. Id. at 536.
40. See id. at 513-16 (discussing the constitutionality of RFRA).
41. Id. at536.
42. See id. at 535 (invalidating RFRA and stating that burdens imposed on religious
organizations by neutral laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
43. See Farrell, supra note 23, at 127 (noting uncertainty as to the impact that Smith
neutrality has had on the constitutional issues implicated when victims file lawsuits against
religious organizations seeking to hold the organizations liable for the actions of clerics
employed by the organization).
44. Id. at 135 (discussing the argument that negligence claims do not implicate religious
doctrine and are therefore neutral for purposes of Smith).
45. See, e.g., Mark E. Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious Institutions,44 B.C. L.
REv. 1089, 1115 (2003) ("It would seem difficult to complete [an evaluation of a religious
organization's hiring practices] without in some sense trolling through religious beliefs and
practices.").
46.

Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In Schmidt, the complainant
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Ecclesiastical Abstention: "[A]ny inquiry into the policies and practices of
the Church Defendants in hiring or supervising their clergy raises ... First
Amendment problems of entanglement ... which might involve the Court

in making sensitive judgments about the propriety of47 the Church
Defendant's supervision in light of their religious beliefs."
Judicial concern over excessive entanglement is grounded in the
Establishment Clause prong of the doctrine of Ecclesiastical Abstention.4 8
In particular, the concern over adjudicating negligence-based tort actions
levied against religious institutions centers on the idea that by setting
objectively reasonable standards of conduct for religious organizations,
courts would violate the Establishment Clause by judicially endorsing a
particular method of hiring, supervising, or retaining a cleric.49 In the
opinion of the Schmidt court, an award of damages against a religious
institution for failure to comply with a reasonable standard of conduct
"would have a chilling effect leading indirectly to state control over the
future conduct of affairs of a religious denomination. ' , 50 Thus, although
negligence claims involve the application of neutral law, inquiring into a
church's decision to ordain or maintain a priest might arguably violate the
Establishment Clause by entangling a court in the doctrines of canon law
and the policies of diocesan governance. 51

brought suit against the church-employer of a Presbyterian minister who had sexually abused
the complainant over a period of several decades. Id. at 324. The complainant asserted theories
of respondeat superior and negligent placement, retention, and supervision. Id. at 331. The
court reasoned that judicial determination of the propriety of a church's hiring and monitoring
standards would be unconstitutional because judicial approval of ecclesiastical practices would
directly violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 332. The court held it would be
unconstitutional to question church governance, including matters of employee supervision and
retention, and granted summary judgment in favor of the church. Id.
47. Id. at 332.
48. See Nugent, supra note 3, at 975-77 (discussing judicial concern over excessive
entanglement with religious doctrine in the context of the First Amendment Establishment
Clause).
49. See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780,790 (Wis. 1995) ("[Tlhe
First Amendment prevents the courts of this state from determining what makes one competent
to serve as a Catholic priest .... ").
50. Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 332.
51. See Farrell, supra note 23, at 131 ("[A] church's decisions regarding the ordination,
discipline, and dismissal of priests is directly tied to canon law, and therefore falls squarely
within the ban established by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.").
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D. The CurrentState of Third-Party Tort Actions Brought Against
Religious Institutions
Jurisdictions remain divided on the issue of whether tort actions levied
against religious institutions are barred by the First Amendment. 52 Recently,
the Supreme Court of Florida weighed in on the Ecclesiastical Abstention
debate in Malicki v. Doe.53 The plaintiffs in Malicki brought suit against the
Archdiocese of Miami, alleging that the Archdiocese was negligent in hiring
and supervising a priest who perpetrated sexual assaults upon the plaintiffs.54
The opinion included a thorough discussion of both the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause prongs of the doctrine of Ecclesiastical
Abstention.55 The court stated that the allegations against the church
represented "classic elements" of generally applicable claims of negligent hiring
and negligent supervision.56 The court reasoned that these claims were
grounded in generally applicable tort law under Smith and therefore did not
implicate religious doctrine.57 Next, the court dismissed the issue of excessive
entanglement in light of the Establishment Clause, simply declaring that
"imposing tort liability based on the allegations of the complaint neither
advances nor inhibits religion." 58 Having made these findings, the court held
that the First Amendment could not itself serve as the impetus for dismissing a

claim grounded in a religious institution's negligence.59
52. See id. at 134 (noting that while "there are compelling arguments on both sides of the
issue.., there is a lack of consensus in the state and federal courts as to which interest will win
out").
53. Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002). In Malicki, the respondents, a minor
male and an adult female, brought suit against the Archdiocese of Miami, asserting that the
Diocese's negligent hiring and supervision of a sexually abusive priest was the cause of their
injuries. Id. at 352. The Church sought dismissal of the claims, citing First Amendment
religion protection. Id. at 357. The court reasoned that allowing the claims to go forward
would not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the generally applicable tort law was being
neutrally applied. Id. at 363-64. Furthermore, the court determined that adjudication of the
claims would not involve excessive entanglement such as would violate the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 364. The court therefore concluded that the claims were not barred by the First
Amendment. Id. at 365.
54. Id. at 352.
55. See id. at 357 ("Although an entanglement inquiry is associated with the adjudication
of an Establishment Clause claim, the extent to which courts will be called upon to determine
matters of church practice also implicates the Free Exercise Clause.").
56. Id. at 362.
57. See id. at 363-64 (stating that issues of foreseeability of the priest's conduct did not
implicate religious doctrine for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause).
58. Id. at 364.
59. See id. at 365 (refusing to dismiss petitioner's claim in light of respondent's
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If Malicki represents the modem trend in the Ecclesiastical Abstention
doctrine, present-day plaintiffs have much less to fear when asserting
negligence claims against religious institutions. Respondeat superior claims
should find the First Amendment even less of a barrier. Like negligence-based
tort claims, respondeat superior claims are neutral for purposes of Smith and are
therefore only minimally impeded by the Free Exercise Clause portion of the
doctrine of Ecclesiastical Abstention .60 Furthermore, the Establishment Clause
excessive-entanglement issue does not present the same concern for respondeat
superior claims as it would in claims grounded in negligence. The primary
concern over excessive entanglement is that by determining an objectively
reasonable standard by which a religious institution is to hire, supervise, or
discipline its employees, a court would be officially sanctioning religious
conduct conforming to such a standard. 6 1 Religious institutions would be
compelled to comply with the objectively reasonable standard, whether or not it
conforms with their belief systems, in order to avoid the imposition of liability.
Respondeat superior claims would not implicate this concern over
religious conformity to judicially mandated standards. The theory of
respondeat superior states that an employer who is not at fault is nonetheless
held liable for an employee's tortious conduct if the conduct occurs within the
scope of employment. 62 Under the doctrine, no amount of care exercised by the
employer to prevent tortious conduct by an employee will absolve the employer
of liability if an employee commits a tort within the scope of employment.63
Ecclesiastical Abstention argument). The majority stated:
[T]he First Amendment cannot be used at the initial pleading stage to shut the
courthouse door on a plaintiffs claims, which are founded on a religious
institution's alleged negligence arising from the institution's failure to prevent harm
resulting from one of its clergy who sexually assaults and batters a minor or adult
parishioner.
Id.
60. See Zanita E. Fenton, Faithin Justice: Fiduciaries,Malpractice& Sexual Abuse by
Clergy, 8 MIcH. J. GENDER & L. 45, 80 (2001) ("[I]t is clear that tort doctrines have evolved.
without regard to religious practices and are uniformly applicable whether or not the conduct is
religiously inspired.").
61.
See Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321,332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (opining that judicial
inquiry into the propriety of a religious institution's supervisory practices would lead indirectly
to state control over the affairs of a religious organization, which would violate the
Establishment Clause).
62. See Hamilton v. Carell, 243 F.3d 992, 1001 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that under
respondeat superior "an employer is liable, despite having no fault whatsoever, for the acts of its
employees taken within the scope of their employment").
63. See Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1348 n.8 (Cal. 1991) (noting that
an employer can be held liable for the tortious conduct of an employee regardless of the
preventative measures taken by the employer). Specifically, the court stated:
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Therefore, religious institutions would be under no direct pressure to alter their
hiring, retention, or discipline procedures in ways that might conflict with their
beliefs. While general concerns about the propriety of a court determining the
scope of a cleric's employment may remain, respondeat superior claims should
fare better than their negligence-based counterparts under the doctrine of
Ecclesiastical Abstention.
III. Respondeat Superior and Intentional Torts
A. Respondeat Superior: Elements and Policies
In establishing a respondeat superior claim, a plaintiff must prove the
existence of an employer-employee relationship. 64 Numerous factors may be
relevant in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship,
including the degree of control exercised by the principal, the type of
occupation, the skill required for performance of occupational duties, and the
method of payment. 65 Except in rare circumstances, courts cannot impose
respondeat superior liability in the absence of an employer-employee
relationship. 66
Assuming the existence of an employer-employee relationship, a court's
next task is to decide whether the conduct occurred within the scope of
employment. Determining whether an employee's act falls within the scope of
employment is ordinarily a question of fact.67 In cases in which "'reasonable
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the employer is held vicariously liable
for the tortious conduct of its employees that is within the scope of employment.
The employer's liability is unaffected by the steps it has taken to prevent such
conduct. How best to prevent similar conduct in the future is a matter left to the
employer; the doctrine provides an incentive for the employer to determine the
appropriate measures to implement.
Id.
64. See, e.g., Greene v. Amritsar Auto Servs. Co., 206 F. Supp. 2d 4, 8 (D.D.C. 2002)
("In order to find an employer vicariously liable for an employee's acts, a court must first
determine that an employer-employee, or 'master-servant' relationship in fact exists.").
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958) (listing factors to be considered
in distinguishing between a servant-employee and an independent contractor).
66. See, e.g., Greene, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 8 (noting a rare exception to the employeremployee requirement allowing District of Columbia taxicab companies to be held vicariously
liable for their drivers' actions despite the fact that taxicab drivers are generally independent
contractors rather than employees).
67. See, e.g., Murphy v. Pleasantville Sch. Dist., No. 4-06-CV-10010, U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22063, at * 12 (S.D. Iowa May 4, 2000) (stating that that the question of whether an act occurred
within the scope of employment is usually a question of fact for the jury); Clover v. Snowbird
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minds may differ as to whether the [employee] was at a certain time involved
wholly or partly in the performance of [the employer's] business or within the
scope of employment,"' the question must be submitted to the jury.68 Although
states sometimes differ in their articulation of the scope-of-employment
requirement, 69 the general rule is that an act falls within the scope of
employment if the conduct (1) was of the kind of work that the employee was
hired to perform; (2) took place within the typical temporal and spatial limits of
the workplace; and (3) was motivated, at least in part, to serve the interests of
the employer.7 °
The Supreme Court of Utah considered an archetypal claim of respondeat
superior in Christensenv. Swenson.7 1 Swenson, a security guard employed by
Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991) (same).
68. Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994) (quoting Birkner v. Salt Lake
County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989)).
69. Compare Osborne v. Payne, 31 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Ky. 2000) ("[T]o be within the
scope of its employment, the conduct must be of the same general nature as that authorized or
incidental to the conduct authorized."), and Beach v. Jean, 746 A.2d 228,232 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1999) ("The phrase 'in the course of employment' ... means while engaged in the service of the
master ....), with Jeffrey E. v. Cent. Baptist Church, 243 Cal. Rptr. 128, 130 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) ("The determination as to whether an employee committed a tort during the course of his
employment turns on whether 1) the act performed was either required or 'incident to his
duties' ... , or 2) the employee's misconduct could be reasonably foreseen by the employer in
any event.") (internal citations omitted).
70. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 465
(5th ed. 1984) ("In general, a servant's conduct is within the scope of employment if it is the
kind which he is employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time
and space, and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master."); see also Lucas v.
Leary, 98-2549, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 114, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2001)
("[Clonduct of an agent is within the scope of employment if it is of the kind he is employed to
perform... if it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits.., and it is
motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer ....); Chesterman v. Barmon,
753 P.2d 404, 406 (Or. 1988) (stating that an employee's action falls within the scope of
employment if it occurred substantially within the time and space limits authorized by the
employment; was motivated, at least in part, to serve the interests of the employer; and was the
kind of work that the employee was hired to perform); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 229 (1958) (stating that in determining whether unauthorized conduct falls within the scope of
employment, courts should weigh factors including an employee's departure from the normal
method of reaching an authorized result; whether or not the instrumentality of harm was
furnished by the employer; the time, place and purpose of the act; and whether or not the
employer had reason to believe that such an act would be done). But see Lisa M. v. Henry
Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 361 (Cal. 1995) (stating that California has
abandoned the traditional requirement that the employee's actions were motivated to serve the
interests of the employer); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329
N.W.2d 306, 308 (Minn. 1983) (rejecting as an arbitrary judicial determination the requirement
that the tortious conduct be intended to further the interests of the employer (citing Large v.
Nat'l Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 1973))).
71. Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125 (Utah 1994). In Swenson, Christensen sought
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Burns International Security Services (Burns), left her post at the Geneva Steel
Plant (Geneva) to pick up lunch at a nearby restaurant. 72 On her way back to
work, Swenson collided with a motorcycle operated by the plaintiff
Christensen.7 3 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Bums, holding as a matter of law that Swenson was not
within the ordinary spatial boundaries of her employment at the time of the
accident because the accident did not occur on Geneva property.74
In reversing the court of appeals, the Utah Supreme Court addressed each
of the three criteria relevant in that jurisdiction for determining whether an
action falls within the scope of employment. 75 As to the first criterion, the
Court concluded that reasonable minds could differ as to whether Swenson's
trip to the local cafe was the type of work that Swenson was hired to perform.76
Noting Swenson's assertion that her role as a security guard was "to see and be
seen" at and around the Geneva plant, the court found that "traveling the short
distance to the Frontier Cafe in uniform arguably heightened the secure
atmosphere that Bums sought to protect. 7 7 After noting that it was undisputed
that the accident occurred during Swenson's usual work hours, the court
concluded that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the accident
occurred within the spatial boundaries of Swenson's workplace.78 The court
reasoned that because it occurred within a geographic area accessible during an
to hold Burns International Security Services (Bums) vicariously liable for the negligent
conduct of its employee, Swenson. Id. at 126. While driving back to work during a lunch
break, Swenson collided with a motorcycle operated by Christensen, who was injured in the
collision. Id. The trial court granted Bums's motion for summary judgment, finding that
Swenson was not acting within the scope of employment at the time of the accident. Id. at 127.
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding as a matter of law that Swenson's trip to the local
restaurant was outside the scope of her employment. Id. In analyzing whether Swenson's
conduct was within the scope of employment, the Utah Supreme Court considered three factors:
(1) whether Swenson's actions were the type of work she was hired to perform; (2) whether the
accident occurred within the typical temporal and spatial boundaries of Swenson's work; and
(3) whether Swenson's actions in any way furthered the interest of her employer. Id. at 128-29.
The court concluded that reasonable minds could differ as to whether Swenson's trip to the
restaurant fell within her scope of employment and that the question should have been submitted
to the jury. Id.
72. Id. at 126.
73. Id. at 126-27.
74. Id. at 127.
75. See id. at 128 ("[T]o avoid a second summary judgment on remand, we address all
three of the [scope-of-employment] criteria.").
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. (finding that the accident occurred during working hours and that the accident
may have occurred substantially within the ordinary spatial boundaries of employment).
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authorized lunch break, the accident arguably occurred substantially within the
normal spatial boundaries of work.7 9 Finally, the court recognized that
employee breaks serve the interests of the employer by satisfying the needs of
8 ° Swenson is
employees, thereby creating a more productive workforce.
illustrative both of the flexibility of the doctrine 8 1 and of a general judicial
policy strongly favoring the submission of respondeat superior claims to the
82

jury.

Courts weigh policy considerations in determining when to apply this
rather harsh form of vicarious liability. 83 As guidelines for applying the
doctrine, courts have recognized three distinct policy goals: (1) preventing
future injuries; (2) assuring that the victim will be compensated; and
(3) spreading losses equitably. 84 Application of the doctrine can prevent future
injuries by giving employers a strong incentive to hire employees who are
unlikely to engage in tortious conduct and to discipline or dismiss employees
who have acted negligently.85 The doctrine can assure compensation for a
79. See id. at 128-29 (stating that a question of fact existed as to whether the accident
occurred within the normal spatial boundaries of work). The court stated:
[Swenson] was attempting to obtain lunch from a restaurant within the geographic
area accessible during her ten- to fifteen-minute break. Given the other facts of this
case, reasonable minds could differ as to whether Swenson's trip to the Frontier
Cafe fell substantially within the ordinary spatial boundaries of her employment.
Id.
80. See id. at 129 ("Employees must occasionally eat meals and use the restroom, and
employers receive the corresponding benefit of productive, satisfied employees.").
81. See id. at 128 n.1 ("The [scope-of-employment] criteria cannot be rigidly applied to
every fact pattern. Some flexibility is required....").
82. See Perez v. Van Groningren & Sons, Inc., 719 P.2d 676,679 (Cal. 1986) (stating that
whether an action falls within the scope of employment is a question of fact for the jury unless
"the facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible").
83. See, e.g., Wilson v. Drake, 87 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting "three policy
considerations, which underlie California's respondeat superior law: '(1) to prevent recurrence
of tortious conduct; (2) to give greater assurance of compensation for the victim; and (3) to
ensure that the victim's losses will be equitably borne by those who benefit from the enterprise
that gave rise to the injury"' (quoting Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1343-44
(Cal. 1991))).
84. See Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 366 (Cal. 1995)
(describing policy considerations that should be used as guidelines in determining whether to
apply the doctrine).
85. See id. (stating that increased precautionary measures are a benefit that results from
imposing vicarious liability on employers). But see Gary Schwartz, The Hidden and
FundamentalIssue of Employer VicariousLiability, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1739, 1758-59 (1996)
(discussing the impact of vicarious liability on the disciplinary practices of employers and
suggesting that employers face too many legal impediments in hiring and disciplinary decisions
to validate this policy).
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victim where the employee is judgment-proof by reaching the deeper pockets of
the employer.8 6 Finally, the doctrine can be used to spread costs of an injury to
the cheapest-cost bearers-the employer who benefits from the employment
relationship. 87
B. Application of Respondeat Superior to Intentional Torts
The Restatement (Second) of Agency specifically states that "[a]n act may
' 88
be within the scope of employment although consciously criminal or tortious. "
The authors of the Restatement, however, envisioned a fine line between
intentional torts that fall within the scope of employment and those that fall
beyond the scope, as indicated by the following example:
[A] gardener using a small stick in an assault upon a trespassing child to
exclude him from the premises may be found to be acting within the scope
of employment; if, however, the gardener were to shoot the child for the
same purpose it would be difficult to find the act within the scope of
employment. 89

Some courts have taken it upon themselves to discern this fine line,
deciding as a matter of law whether certain intentional torts, including sexual
assault, fall within the scope of employment. 90 Various jurisdictions have
articulated their own standards for determining whether an intentional tort is
arguably within the scope of employment so as to warrant submission of the
issue to the jury, 91 and inconsistencies in the submission of intentional tort
86. See Lisa M., 907 P.2d at 366-67 (stating that imposing vicarious liability on
employers is likely to provide additional compensation to victims).
87. See Johnston v. Long, 181 P.2d 645, 651 (Cal. 1947) ("The principal justification for
the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior in any case is the fact that the employer
may spread the risk through insurance and carry the cost thereof as part of his costs of doing
business."); see also Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychology & Neurology, Ltd., 329
N.W.2d 306, 314 (Minn. 1983) (Peterson, J., dissenting) (describing the cost-spreading
rationale as "appeal[ing] to an instinctive sense of justice").
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 231 (1958); see also Lisa M., 907 P.2d at 36061 (noting that "an employee's willful, malicious and even criminal torts may fall within the
scope of his or her employment.., even though the employer has not authorized the employee
to commit crimes or intentional torts").
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 231 cmt. a (1958).
90. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Zizka, CV9505552225, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 619, at *8
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 1998) (holding that "when the tortfeasor-employee's activity with the
alleged victim became sexual, the employee abandoned and ceased to further the employer's
business").
91. See Lisa M., 907 P.2d at 361 ("[T]he employer will not be held liable for an assault or
other intentional tort that did not have a causal nexus to an employee's work."); Glucksman v.
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claims to juries are indicative of the difficulty courts face in making this
determination.9 2
Although employee intentional torts might frequently occur within the
temporal and spatial limits of the workplace, as a practical matter it is difficult
to identify situations where an employee's intentional tort both was the type of
work the employee was hired to do and was committed, at least in part, to
further the interests of the employer. Only in the strangest of circumstances
would an employer explicitly authorize an employee's intentional tort such that
the tortious conduct would neatly fit into the latter two prongs of the scope-ofemployment test. 93 Application of the motive-to-serve prong of the test to an
intentional tort claim would by itself preclude a finding of vicarious liability in
nearly all such cases. 94 Recognizing this problem, some jurisdictions have
95
eliminated the motive-to-serve prong of the scope-of-employment analysis.

Walters, 659 A.2d 1217, 1219 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (stating that the inquiry turns on "whether
the servant on the occasion in question was engaged in a disobedient or unfaithful conducting of
the master's business, or was engaged in an abandonment of the master's business"); Medlin v.
Bass, 398 S.E.2d 460, 463 (N.C. 1990) (asking whether the employee was "about his master's
business or whether he stepped aside from his employment to commit a wrong prompted by a
spirit of vindictiveness or to gratify his personal animosity or to carry out an independent
purpose of his own").
92. Compare Carr v. Wm.C. Crowell Co., 171 P.2d 5,7-8 (Cal. 1946) (holding building
contractor vicariously liable when employee threw a hammer at subcontractor's employee),
Pelletier v. Bilbiles, 227 A.2d 251, 253 (Conn. 1967) (denying summary judgment in favor of
employer and stating that "the beating of an unruly customer... is an extremely forceful,
although misguided, method of discouraging patrons... from causing disturbances on the
premises in the future"), and Munick v. City of Durham, 106 S.E. 665,667 (N.C. 1921) (finding
question of fact for jury when city employee assaulted plaintiff after plaintiff paid portion of his
water bill in pennies), with Hart v. Paint Valley Local Sch. Dist., CZ-01-004, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25720, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 15,2002) (granting summary judgment in favor of school
district where school teacher fondled fourth-grade student), and Thorn v. City of Glendale, 35
Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 6-7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (finding no vicarious liability where city fire marshal
set business premises on fire during inspection).
93. See Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1166 n.4 (Or. 1999) ("[A]n employee's
intentional tort rarely, if ever, will have been authorized expressly by the employer.").
94. See Lisa M., 907 P.2d at 364 (opining that "mechanical application of a motivation-toserve test for intentional torts... would bar vicarious liability for virtually all sexual
misconduct").
95. See, e.g., Lisa M., 907 P.2d. at 361 (stating that California has abandoned the
traditional requirement that the employee's actions must be motivated by a desire to serve the
interests of the employer); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329
N.W.2d 306, 309-10 (Minn. 1983) (rejecting as an arbitrary judicial determination the
requirement that the tortious conduct be intended to further the interests of the employer (citing
Lange v. Nat'l Buscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. 1973))).
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In Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic ofPsychiatryandNeurology, Ltd.,96 the
Minnesota Supreme Court abolished, in matters involving intentional torts, the
traditional scope-of-employment requirement that the imposition of vicarious
liability be conditioned on a finding that the employee's conduct was motivated
to serve the interests of the employer. 97 The court stated that "[f]or an
intentional tort, the focus is on whether the assault arises out of a dispute
occurring within the scope of employment," 98 and that "[i]t is irrelevant whether
the actual assault involves a motivation to serve the master." 99 In discussing the
rationale for abolishing the motive-to-serve requirement in cases of intentional
torts, the court noted that the requirement would preclude respondeat superior
liability in nearly all such cases.1°° Furthermore, the court found it to be
unrealistic for a trier of fact to determine the point at which an employee's
actions ceased to be motivated by the furtherance of the employer's interests
and were instead wholly personally motivated.' 0' It is interesting to note that
despite abolishing the motive-to-serve requirement in cases involving
intentional torts, the Marston court preserved the requirement in vicarious
liability claims based on unintentional employee conduct. 10 2 California has also
abolished the motive-to-serve prong of the traditional scope-of-employment

96. Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306
(Minn. 1983). In Marston, the petitioners sought review of the trial court's instruction to the
jury on the definition of scope of employment. Id. at 309. The case involved two plaintiffs who
were sexually assaulted during the course of their treatment by a doctor employed by the
Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology. Id. at 308. The plaintiffs sought to hold the
clinic vicariously liable, claiming that the doctor committed the assaults within the scope of his
employment. Id. at 307. The trial court rejected the plaintiffs' proposed jury instructions,
which omitted the motivation-to-serve prong of the respondeat superior analysis, and instead
provided the jurors with an instruction that included the motivation-to-serve test. Id. at 309.
Reasoning that "it would be a rare situation where a wrongful act would actually further the
employer's business," the Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded that the motivation behind
the employee's actions is irrelevant for purposes of determining vicarious liability. Id. at 311.
97. See id. at 309-10 ("We reject as the basis for imposing liability the arbitrary
determination of when, and at what point.... [intentional torts] leave the sphere of the
employer's business and become motivated by personal animosity." (quoting Lange v. Nat'l
Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn. 1973))).
98. Id. at 310.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 311 (stating that it would be a rare occurrence in which an employee's
intentional tort was actually motivated to further the interests of the employer).
101. See id. (describing the task of determining whether an action was motivated to further
the interests of the employer as "both unrealistic and artificial").
102. See id. at 310 (preserving the motivation-to-serve prong of the traditional analysis in
cases involving negligence-based torts).
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for both
test, but unlike Minnesota, California has abolished the prong
03
intentional torts and negligence-based vicarious liability claims.
The approach taken by California and Minnesota recognizes the futility of
applying the traditional common law motive-to-serve requirement to intentional
torts.' 4 The alternative scope-of-employment inquiry postulated by these
05
jurisdictions has been deemed the "engendered by the employment" test.
Rather than applying the inflexible traditional scope-of-employment analysis,
including determining whether the employee's conduct was motivated by a
desire to serve the interests of the employer, the engendered by the employment
test asks more generally whether there existed a causal nexus between the
employment relationship and the tortious conduct. 0 6 To satisfy the engendered
by the employment test, the causal nexus between the employment and the
resulting harm "must be more than that the work provided the opportunity for
interaction between the victim and the tortfeasor." 107 Instead, the test requires
that the tortious conduct be an outgrowth of the employment relationship and
that the conduct be foreseeable to the employer.108 The test is a fact-specific
analysis that yields different results depending upon the employment
relationship at issue. 109
C. The Fearing Analysis
In Fearing v. Bucher, the Supreme Court of Oregon addressed the
problems associated with applying the doctrine of respondeat superior to
intentional torts. 1 0 The petitioner in Fearing alleged that a priest
103. See Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 361 (Cal. 1995)
(stating that California has abandoned the traditional requirement that the employee's actions
must be motivated by a desire to serve the interests of the employer).
104. See Paula J. Dalley, All in a Day's Work: Employers' Vicarious Liabilityfor Sexual
Harassment, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 517, 544-47 (2002) (noting the difficulties inherent in
applying the motive-to-serve test to intentional torts).
105. See id. at 547 (stating that the California approach is called the "engendered by the
employment" test).
106. See id. (describing the elements of the engendered by the employment inquiry); see
also Lisa M., 907 P.2d at 364 ("[A] sexual tort will not be considered engendered by the
employment unless its motivating emotions were fairly attributable to work related events or
conditions.").
107. Dalley, supra note 104, at 547.
108. See id. at 547-48 (discussing the requisite causal nexus in terms of foreseeability).
109. See id. at 547 (noting that whether conduct falls within the scope of employment
depends upon the employee's duties).
110. See Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1167 (Or. 1999) (noting difficulties with
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2
employed"' by the Archdiocese of Portland had sexually molested him."
Recognizing a need for a different respondeat superior analysis in the context of
intentional torts, the court stated:

[I]n the intentional tort context, it usually is inappropriate for the court to
base its decision regarding the adequacy of the complaint on whether the
complaint contains allegations that the intentional tort itself was committed
in furtherance of any interest of the employer or was of the same kind of
activities that the employee was hired to perform. Such circumstances
rarely will occur and are not, in any event, necessary to vicarious liability.
Rather, the focus properly is directed at whether the complaint contains
sufficient allegations of [the defendant's] conduct that was within the scope
of his employment3 that arguably resulted in the acts that caused the
plaintiff s injury."

Instead of asking whether the intentional tort itself was within the scope of
employment, the Fearing analysis inquires as to whether the tortfeasor's
conduct leading up to the intentional tort was conduct that falls within the
scope of employment.1 4 When a reasonable jury could find that the
employee's conduct was a "necessary precursor to the [intentional torts] and the
[torts] were a direct outgrowth of and were engendered by conduct that was
within the scope of ...employment," the causation question becomes a
question of fact that must be left to the jury." 5 One commentator has
accurately described the Fearinganalysis as "a combination of the 'engendered
by the [employment]' and the [traditional] purpose-to-serve tests," due to the
fact that it focuses on the causal nexus requirement of the engendered by the

applying respondeat superior to intentional torts).
111. One commentator has argued that "[w]ith a disparity in hiring practices among
religious institutions, it is again too difficult to apply respondeat superior to the church because
of the difficulty in defining the employer-employee relationship and the lack of uniformity in its
application." Emily C. Short, Torts: Prayingfor the Parishor Preying on the Parish? Clergy
Sexual Misconduct and the Tort of Clergy Malpractice,57 OKLA. L. REv. 183, 198 (2004).
Most courts that have directly addressed the issue have concluded that a diocese and a priest can
be considered to be in an employer-employee relationship. See, e.g., Ambrosio v. Price, 495 F.
Supp. 381, 383-86 (D. Neb. 1979) (holding that diocese and priest did have employer-employee
relationship); Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453,
1461 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (same). But see Brillhart v. Scheier, 758 P.2d 219, 224 (Kan. 1988)
(concluding that priest was an independent contractor, not an employee, and that vicarious
liability was therefore inapplicable).
112. Fearing,977 P.2d at 1164. For a complete description of the facts of the case, see
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
113. Id. at 1167 (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1168.
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employment test, yet the analysis retains the
motive-to-serve requirement of the
16
traditional scope-of-employment inquiry.
Although at first blush the Fearing analysis appears to be a departure from
the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, a closer look reveals that the
examination is merely a clarification of the standard respondeat superior
inquiry. In Christensen v. Swenson, 17 the Utah Supreme Court considered

whether an employee's motor vehicle accident fell within the scope of
employment. 118 When inquiring as to whether the employee's conduct was the
type of work for which she was hired and whether the employee's conduct
furthered any interests of the employer, the court did not ask whether the act of
crashing a car into a motorcyclist satisfied these two requirements; rather, the
court inquired as to whether leaving the premises to pick up lunch was the kind
of work that Swenson was hired to perform or in any way furthered the interests
of her employer. 1 9 Similarly, in Fearing, the court did not inquire as to
whether the act of molesting a child either was the type of work for which a
priest is hired or furthers the interests of the church; instead, the court asked
whether spending time alone with parishioners, counseling them, and gaining
their trust were acts that could satisfy these two requirements. 120
The Fearinganalysis is not a radical alteration of the traditional scope-ofemployment prerequisite. Rather, the court properly refocused the scope-ofemployment inquiry towards the conduct leading up to the intentional tort.' 2'
This shift allows courts to overcome the erroneous initial impulse to dismiss
respondeat superior claims arising out of intentional torts simply because such
claims fail to convincingly allege that the intentional tort itself either furthered
the interests of the employer122 or was the kind of work that the employee was
116. Dalley, supra note 104, at 558 n.248.
117. For a discussion of the facts of this case, see supra Part III.A.
118. See Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d. 125, 127 (Utah 1994) (considering whether
the defendant's actions were arguably within the scope of employment). For a discussion of the
facts of this case, see supra Part M.A.
119. See id. at 128-29 (discussing Swenson's trip to the cafe in light of the three scope-ofemployment requirements).
120. See Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Or. 1999) (discussing the conduct of the
priest leading up to the assaults).
121. See id. at 1166 n.4 (stating that in matters involving intentional torts "it virtually
always will be necessary to look to the acts that led to the injury to determine if those acts were
within the scope of employment").
122. See, e.g., Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66, 71 (D. Conn.
1995) (finding sexual conduct to be outside the scope of employment as a matter of law in light
of the Roman Catholic Church's mandate of celibacy for priests). In dismissing the plaintiff's
respondeat superior claim, the court stated:
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the alleged sexual abuse by Doyle
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hired to perform. 123 By refocusing the inquiry, the Fearing analysis allows
courts to determine whether the tortious conduct was an outgrowth of actions
taken within the scope of employment. This wording of the Fearinganalysis is
far more accommodating to intentional torts than is the traditional scope-ofemployment inquiry. Furthermore, this approach recognizes that, depending on
the nature of the employee-third party relationship, intentional torts committed
by employees may well be fairly attributable to the employer--even though the
intentional tort itself did not occur within the scope of employment-when the
tort was an outgrowth of conduct that was within the scope of employment.
The Fearing analysis opens the door to jury determination of the scope-ofemployment question and gives victims of intentional torts a greater chance at
recovering against the tortfeasor's employer. It allows factual analysis and
policy considerations, rather than rigid and poorly suited traditional respondeat
superior rules, to determine whether an employer should be held vicariously
liable for the intentional tortious conduct of an employee.

IV. The Nature of the Cleric-ParishionerRelationship
A. The Significance of the Employee-Third Party Relationship
When applying the Fearing analysis to cases involving intentional torts
committed by employees against third parties, a court must consider the nature
of the employee-third party relationship. 124 In Fearing,the Supreme Court of
Oregon based its holding largely on the plaintiff's allegation that there was a
causal nexus between the sexual abuse and the priest's officially sanctioned
duties. 125 It dismissed the Archdiocese's assertion that if a religious
was motivated by any purpose or object that would serve his employer. Indeed, as
the affidavits submitted by the defendants indicate, the laws and standards of the
Roman Catholic Church expressly prohibit priests from engaging in any sexual
activity of any kind. Thus, even if Doyle engaged in sexually abusive conduct, he
did so only after abandoning the church's tenets and his personal commitment to
celibacy. Sexually abusive conduct amounts to the abandonment of the Church's
business. As a matter of law, therefore, the alleged sexual abuse, even if true,
cannot be said to further the defendant's business and therefore is outside of the
scope of employment.
Id.
123. See, e.g., Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, 32
F.3d 953,960 (5th Cir. 1994) ("It would be hard to imagine a more difficult argument than that
[a priest's] illicit sexual pursuits were somehow related to his duties as a priest.").
124. See Fearing,977 P.2d at 1168 (discussing the alleged interactions between the priest
and parishioner in light of the priest's duties).
125. See id. (discussing the intimate nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the
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organization may be held liable for a cleric's sexual misconduct, any employer
could be held liable for an employee's intentional torts merely because the
employer provided the employee with the opportunity to be alone with third
parties. 126 The court distinguished its holding in G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals,127 which involved the sexual assault of an unconscious hospital
patient by a respiratory therapist, noting that in G.L. "the only nexus alleged
between the employment and the assault was that the employment brought the
tortfeasor and the victim together in time and place and, therefore, gave the
tortfeasor the 'opportunity' to commit the assaults." 128 In contrast, the causal
nexus in Fearing involved the priest's manipulation of authority so as to
"befriend plaintiff and his family, gain their trust, spend large periods of time
alone with plaintiff, physically touch plaintiff and, ultimately, to gain the
opportunity to commit the sexual assaults upon him."129 The intimate nature of
the relationship between the priest and the victim, and the nexus between the
priest's employment and his sexual assaults, would allow a reasonable jury to
"infer that Bucher's performance of his pastoral duties with respect to plaintiff
and his family were a necessary precursor to the sexual abuse and that the
assaults thus were a direct outgrowth of and were engendered by conduct that
was within the scope of Bucher's employment."1 30 Fearing'srequirement of a
causal nexus recognizes that the nature of the job-created relationship between
the employee and the third-party victim is a crucial factor for determining
whether the scope-of-employment issue should be decided as a matter of law or
is instead a question of fact for the jury.
Other courts applying approaches similar to the Fearinganalysis have also
found the nature of the employee-third party relationship to be a significant
priest and citing the nature of the relationship as being the distinguishing factor between the
instant case and contradictory authority).
126. See id. at 1167 (disagreeing with the defendant Archdiocese's contention that the only
link between the sexual assault and the priest's employment was the mere opportunity to be
alone with the victim, an incidental aspect of the priest's employment).
127. G.L. v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 757 P.2d 1347 (Or. 1988). In G.L., the plaintiff filed a
claim against a hospital after a respiratory therapist sexually assaulted the plaintiff during her
stay at the hospital. Id. at 1348. The plaintiff sought to hold the hospital vicariously liable for
the employee's actions, arguing that public policy mandated that the hospital, rather than the
victim, should bear the loss resulting from the sexual assault. Id. at 1349. The court analyzed
the claim in light of the doctrine of respondeat superior and the policies underlying the doctrine.
Id. at 1350. Finding that "there is no allegation-and we cannot imagine one-that the
employee was acting for the purpose of furthering any interest of the employer," the court
concluded that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for vicarious liability. Id.
128. Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Or. 1999).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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factor in determining whether to submit the scope-of-employment question to
the jury.131 In Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital,132 the
Supreme Court of California held that a hospital was not vicariously liable for a
sexual assault perpetrated by an ultrasound technician during a routine
examination. 33 California has rejected the traditional motive-to-serve
requirement for respondeat superior liability,' 34 and Lisa M. applied the
engendered by the employment test, a standard similar to the Fearing
analysis. 35 After considering the existence of a causal nexus and weighing the
foreseeability of the harm, the court held that the sexual assault was outside of
the scope of employment as a matter of law.' 36 But the court explicitly stated
that sexual assaults are not per se outside of the scope of employment. 3 7
131. See, e.g., Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d. 358, 365 (Cal.
1995) (noting the lack of emotional involvement between the hospital technician and abused
patient as influential in the court's conclusion that the sexual assault was outside the scope of
employment as a matter of law).
132. Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1995). Lisa M.
involved a patient seeking to hold a hospital vicariously liable for a sexual assault committed by
an ultrasound technician employed by the hospital. Id. at 359-60. The trial court granted the
hospital's motion for summary judgment on the issue of respondeat superior, but the court of
appeals reversed the trial court. Id. at 360. The Supreme Court of California addressed the
plaintiff's respondeat superior claim by considering both the existence of a causal nexus
between the ultrasound technician's employment and the victim's injury and the foreseeability
of the harm. Id. at 363-66. The court found that the technician's employment lacked the
requisite causal nexus with the patient's injury and that the assault was not foreseeable by the
hospital. Id. at 367. The court reversed the appellate court and held that the trial court did not
err in granting summary judgment for the hospital on the issue of respondeat superior. Id.
133. Id. at 367 (concluding that the employee's sexual assault was not engendered by his
employment so as to render the hospital vicariously liable for the plaintiffs injury).
134. See id. at 361 ("California no longer follows the traditional rule that an employee's
actions are within the scope of employment only if motivated, in whole or part, by a desire to
serve the employer's interest.").
135. See id. at 362 (noting that the engendered by the employment test requires a causal
nexus between the employment relationship and the victim's injury). In articulating the
elements of the test, the court stated:
The nexus required for respondeat superior liability [is] that the tort be engendered
by or arise from the work ....That the employment brought tortfeasor and victim
together in time and place is not enough ....[T]he incident leading to the injury
must be an "outgrowth" of the employment ....California courts have also asked
whether the tort was, in a general way, foreseeable from the employee's duties ....
[F]orseeability "merely means that in the context of the particular enterprise an
employee's conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to
include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer's business."
Id. at 362 (quoting Carr v. Wm.C. Crowell Co., 171 P.2d 5, 8 (Cal. 1946) and Rodgers v.
Kemper Constr. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 149 (Cal. App. 1975)).
136. Id. at 367.
137. See id. at 363 ("We are not persuaded that the roots of sexual violence and
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Before concluding that the facts of the plaintiff's claim did not warrant
submission of the issue to the jury, the court first analyzed the plaintiff's claim
38
in light of the emotional relationship between the tortfeasor and the victim,
and next considered the significance of the ultrasound technician's job-created
authority. 139 The court found no emotional involvement between the two
parties and no coercive authority possessed by the employer such that would
warrant submission of the scope-of-employment question to the jury. 40
Judicial consideration of the employee-third party relationship amounts to
an acknowledgement by courts that not all employment relationships are the
same. While some jobs involve little or no employee contact with third
persons, others permit or even require a great deal of intimate interaction with
third persons. Employment relationships that merely bring "the tortfeasor and
the victim together in time and place and, therefore, [give] the tortfeasor the
'opportunity' to commit the assaul[t]" are not sufficiently intimate to support a
finding that a tortfeasor's sexual assault was an outgrowth of the employment
relationship, and the scope-of-employment question may be properly disposed
of as a matter of law.14 1 On the other hand, employment relationships that
include unilateral or bilateral emotional involvement or the vesting of
significant coercive authority in the employee are highly susceptible to
manipulation. 42 Abuse of trust or misuse of coercive authority to perpetrate a
sexual assault is a foreseeable outgrowth of these employment relationships,
and the scope-of-employment question should be left to the jury. Employeethird party relationships that fit into the latter category generally contain two
distinct, yet closely intertwined, characteristics: (1) emotional vulnerability on
the part of the third party; and (2) job-created authority possessed by the
tortfeasor-employee.

exploitation are in all cases so fundamentally different from those other abhorrent human traits
as to allow a conclusion sexual misconduct is per se unforeseeable in the workplace.").
138. See id.at 365 (noting a lack of mutual or unilateral emotional involvement arising
from the relationship between the ultrasound technician and the patient).
139. See id. at 365-66 (discussing the degree to which the ultrasound technician possessed
coercive authority over the patient).
140. See id. (finding no coercive authority vested in the technician and no emotional
involvement, unilateral or bilateral, between the parties).
141. See Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Or. 1999) (distinguishing the case in
which the employment relationship merely gave the tortfeasor access to the victim).
142. See Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'I Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 365-366 (Cal.
1995) (discussing the impact of emotional involvement and coercive authority on the scope-ofemployment analysis).
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B. Characteristicsof Analogous Employee-Third Party Relationships
1. Trust-DependencyRelationshipsand the Emotional Vulnerability of
Third Parties
The vulnerability of parishioners seeking spiritual guidance or instruction

from clergymen is analogous to a patient's vulnerability in a therapist-patient
relationship. The therapist-patient relationship is one in which the third-party
victim is vulnerable to sexual assault through the manipulation of the trustdependency dynamic. 43 The Ninth Circuit considered a respondeat superior
claim involving a therapy-based relationship in the case of Simmons v. United
States.'44 In Simmons, the plaintiff sought to hold the federal government liable
for the sexual misconduct of a federal employee who, at the time of the
misconduct, was acting as a mental health counselor for the plaintiff.145 The
counselor initiated a sexual relationship with the plaintiff that caused the
46

plaintiff severe psychological distress, culminating in an attempted suicide.

143. See Linda Mabus Jorgenson et al., Transferenceof Liability: Employer Liabilityfor
Sexual Misconduct by Therapists, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1421, 1421 (1995) (discussing the
frequency of sexual misconduct committed by psychotherapists); see also Marston v.
Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn. 1982)
(noting testimony that the potential for "sexual relations between a psychologist and a patient is
a well-known hazard and thus, to a degree, foreseeable and a risk of employment").
144. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986). Simmons involved a
respondeat superior claim filed by the plaintiff against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. Id. at 1364. The plaintiff alleged that a federally employed social worker engaged
in negligent conduct by entering into a sexual relationship with the plaintiff while counseling
her. Id. Following a bench trial in which the plaintiff prevailed, the government appealed,
arguing that the social worker's conduct was outside the scope of employment as a matter of law
and that the government should not have been held liable under respondeat superior. Id. The
court applied the State of Washington's traditional scope-of-employment test, including the
requirement that the tortious conduct be in furtherance of the employer's interests. Id. at 1369.
In analyzing the issues presented, the court entered into a thorough discussion of the
transference phenomenon, a term used in psychology to describe a patient's projection of
feelings on a therapist after the therapist has come to represent a person from the patient's past.
Id. at 1364. The court noted testimony at trial from a psychologist stating that the transference
phenomenon can result in "a symbolic, sometimes conscious sometimes not, parent-child
relationship existing in the therapy setting, even though you have two adults there." Id. at 1365.
Furthermore, the court cited judicial opinions in other jurisdictions noting that "the transference
phenomenon renders the patient particularly vulnerable." Id. at 1370 (quoting Vigilant Ins. Co.
v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 626 F. Supp. 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)). After considering these
factors, the court concluded that "the centrality of transference to therapy renders it impossible
to separate an abuse of transference from the therapy itself." Id. The court affirmed the district
court, holding that the district court correctly applied the principles of respondeat superior. Id.
at 1371.
145. Id. at 1364.
146. See id. (describing the sexual relationship and its impact on the plaintiff).
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The crucial factor in the Ninth Circuit's determination that the counselor's
actions fell within the scope of employment was the counselor's abuse of the
transference phenomenon. 4 7 The court defined the transference phenomenon
as "the term used by psychiatrists and psychologists to denote a patient's
emotional reaction to a therapist" and noted that the phenomenon "is 'generally
applied to the projection of feelings, thoughts and wishes onto the analyst, who
has come to represent some person from the patient's past.' ,1 48 Considering the
vulnerability of the patient, the emotional involvement of the transference
phenomenon, and the centrality of transference in the counselor's course of
an abuse
treatment, the court reasoned that it would be
49 "impossible to separate

of transference from the treatment itself."
The Supreme Court of Alaska considered a set of facts similar to that of
Simmons in Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center.15° Like Simmons, Doe

involved a therapist's abuse of the transference phenomenon in order to initiate
a sexual relationship with a patient. 151 The patient's vulnerability led the Doe
court to hold that "it could reasonably be concluded that the resulting sexual
conduct was 'incidental' to the therapy."' 52 The importance that the court
placed on both the intimacy of the relationship and the vulnerability of the
patient was manifested by the court's willingness to submit the scope-ofemployment question to the jury; this was done despite the fact that the sexual
intercourse between the therapist and the plaintiff did not occur until roughly
one month after the therapy sessions had ended, a time frame which might

147. See id. at 1366 (stating that the crucial factor that leads to the imposition of liability
for sexual involvement between a therapist and a patient is the therapist's use of the transference
phenomenon in the course of treatment).
148. Id. at 1364 (quoting STEDMAN'S MEDICALDICTrONARY 1473 (5th Lawyers' ed. 1982)).
149. id. at 1370.
150. Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990). In Doe, the Supreme
Court of Alaska considered a claim arising out of a sexual relationship between the plaintiff and
her therapist. Id. at 345. The plaintiff sought to hold the therapist's employer vicariously liable
for the conduct of its employee. Id. In reviewing the respondeat superior claim, the court
employed a scope-of-employment test that considered the three factors of the traditional
approach as guidelines, rather than prerequisites, to finding vicarious liability. Id. at 347. As to
the motivation-to-serve prong of the traditional approach, the court stated "that where tortious
conduct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the employee's legitimate work activities,
the 'motivation to serve' test will have been satisfied." Id. at 348. Applying this standard, the
court considered the psychiatrist's use of the transference phenomenon and its impact on the
plaintiff, concluding that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendant on the issue of respondeat superior. Id.
151. See id. (discussing the sexual relationship between the two parties and the use of the
transference phenomenon as part of the therapist's course of treatment).
152. Id.
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easily have been
dismissed as being outside the usual temporal boundaries of
53
employment.1
Although both cases place a great deal of emphasis on the transference
phenomenon itself, 154 the underlying concern is grounded in the patient's
emotional vulnerability resulting from the trust-dependency relationship. 5 5 In a
similar case, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin discussed the patient's emotional
vulnerability caused by the transference phenomenon in general terms of trust,
stating that:
The first and the most basic element of the doctor's charge is acting with this
sense of imparting trust always guiding and governing the relationship. The
relationship between the psychiatrist and his patient is of the most extreme
confidence... because the patient's continued and embryonic stability may
depend upon there being a reliable external
source of meaning and later of
156
identification and direction for him.
Trust and dependence are essential to the effectiveness of psychiatric
therapy, 57 yet these characteristics of the relationship also render the patient
especially vulnerable to manipulation by the therapist. 58 The holdings of
Simmons and Doe embrace a policy rationale that when the known hazards
associated with manipulation of trust-dependency relationships result in injury to
a third party, the employer should arguably bear the loss, and therefore courts
should submit the scope-of-employment question to the jury.

153. See id. at 349 ("A trier of fact might reasonably conclude that the sexual intercourse,
which occurred roughly one month after counseling, was so connected with the tortious misuse
of the transference phenomenon during counseling that it was not 'too far' removed from

authorized time and space limits.").
154. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the
government's argument that Andrews v. UnitedStates, 732 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1984), controlled
the outcome in Simmons, and noting that Andrews did not involve use of the transference
phenomenon); Doe, 791 P.2d at 348 ("Given the transference phenomenon that is alleged to
have occurred in this case, we hold that it could reasonably be concluded that the resulting
sexual conduct was 'incidental' to the therapy.").
155. See Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1371 (distinguishing Andrews on the basis that the
therapist's conduct in Andrews "did not amount to an abuse of a trusting dependency
relationship"); see also Jorgenson et al., supra note 143, at 1438-39 ("[C]ourts no longer
exclusively focus on the abuse of transference or analyze each separate act of the professional to
separate job-related from personal acts.").
156. L.L. v. Med. Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 177-78 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting
D. DAVIDOFF, THE MALPRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRISTS 6 (1973)).
157. See id. at 177 ("In order to benefit from therapy, the patient must develop a trusting
relationship with the psychiatrist.").
158. See id. at 177-78 (discussing the need for a trust-dependency relationship in therapy
and the potential harms that can arise out of the resulting emotional vulnerability).
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2. Power Through Job-CreatedAuthority
The job-created authority possessed by the tortfeasor is another aspect of the
employee-third party relationship that can influence a court in its decision to
submit the scope-of-employment question to the jury. 159 In Mary M. v. City of
Los Angeles, 16 the Supreme Court of California considered whether a reasonable
jury could conclude that a police officer's rape of a female detainee was within
the scope of employment. 161 The rape occurred after the officer detained the
victim, took her to her home, and threatened her with incarceration unless she
submitted to his sexual overtures. 162 The defendant municipality argued that, as a
matter of law, the officer was acting in pursuit of his own personal gratification,
163
After
outside of the scope of his employment, when he committed the rape.
considering both the policy reasons behind the doctrine of respondeat superior
and the broad powers vested in police officers, the court concluded that the trial
properly in submitting the scope-of-employment question to the
court acted
4

jury.

16

159.

See Jorgenson et al., supra note 143, at 1435 (discussing the theory of job-created

authority).
160. Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341 (Cal. 1991). In Mary M., the court
considered whether a municipality could be held vicariously liable for a police officer's rape of
a female detainee. Id. at 1342. The officer stopped the victim for erratic driving and detained
her after she performed poorly during a field-sobriety test. Id. Rather than taking the woman to
jail, the officer drove the plaintiff to her home. Id. After threatening the plaintiff with
incarceration unless she cooperated, the officer raped the plaintiff. Id. at 1342-43. Following
trial, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff and assessed damages against the city. Id. at 1343.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding as a matter of law that the officer was acting outside the
scope of his employment when he raped the plaintiff. Id. On review, the Supreme Court of
California determined that the policy reasons underlying the doctrine of respondeat superior
generally support the imposition of vicarious liability on employers of police officers who
commit sexual assault by abusing their authority. Id. at 1349. The court also discussed the
significant authority possessed by police officers in carrying out their duties. Id. at 1350.
Finding that the officer's initial detainment of the plaintiff was within the scope of his
employment, the court determined that the officer's threats to take the plaintiff to jail if she did
not cease resisting his assault could not be said, as a matter of law, to be outside the scope of his
employment. Id. at 135 1. The court concluded that the trial court was proper in submitting the
scope-of-employment question to the jury. Id. at 1353.
161. See id. at 1347-53 (discussing the scope-of-employment question in light of the police
officer's duties and authority).
162. Id. at 1342-43.
163. See id. at 1350 (addressing defendant's assertion that the rape was, as a matter of law,
outside the scope of the officer's employment).
164. See id. at 1352 (finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the officer's assault
was committed within the scope of his employment). The court stated:
[W]e hold that when, as in this case, a police officer on duty misuses his official
authority by raping a woman whom he has detained, the public entity that employs
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In reaching its decision, the Mary M. court placed a great deal of weight on the
power that police officers possess over third parties. 165 The court thoroughly
discussed not only the actual powers possessed, including the power to detain and
frisk third parties,'6 but also the symbols of state-granted authority possessed by the
officers, including "a distinctively marked car, a uniform, a badge, and a gun."' 67
The court reasoned that in light of the power bestowed upon police officers, "it is
neither startling nor unexpected that on occasion an officer will misuse that
authority by engaging in assaultive conduct.' ' 168 Finding the risk of sexual assaults
to be "broadly incidental to the enterprise of law enforcement," the court stated that
liability for such conduct "may appropriately be imposed on the employing public
entity." 169 Mary M. is indicative ofjudicial willingness to consider the magnitude of
the job-created authority possessed by the tortfeasor when evaluating the
employment relationship and determining whether a causal nexus exists between the
employment relationship and the resulting harm. 170 In matters involving tortfeasors
who are endowed with significant job-created authority, courts recognize that
liability arising from misuse of that authority should be imposed on the employer
171
who granted the authority and benefited therefrom.
3. Summary ofEmployee-Third PartyRelationships
When applying the engendered by the employment test or the Fearing
analysis, courts consider the nature of the employee-third party relationship to
determine whether the scope-of-employment question should be submitted to the

him can be held vicariously liable. This does not mean that, as a matter of law, the
public employer is vicariously liable whenever an on-duty officer commits a sexual
assault. Rather, this is a question of fact for the jury.
Id.
165. See id. at 1349 (noting examples of the "great power and control" police officers
possess over criminal suspects).
166. See id. at 1349-50 (discussing the authority of a police officer to detain suspected
criminals and to frisk detainees).
167. Id. at 1349.
168. Id. at 1350.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 1352 (dismissing judicial authorities from other jurisdictions that "failed to
consider the significance of the extraordinary authority wielded by law enforcement officers").
171. See, e.g., id. at 1353 (finding the scope-of-employment issue to be a question of fact
for the jury and stating that "'[it is, after all, the state which puts the officer in a position to
employ force and which benefits from its use"' (quoting Thomas v. Johnson, 295 F. Supp. 1025,
1032 (D.D.C. 1968))).
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jury. 172 It is noteworthy that in discussing the significance of the relationship at
issue, neither Simmons, Doe, nor Mary M. describes the employee-third party
relationship as being a fiduciary relationship.'73 Yet in each of these cases, the
courts relied on notions of authority and vulnerability inherent in the relationships to
conclude that the scope-of-employment issue was a question of fact. 174 The obvious
implication is that the significance of the employee-third party relationship to the
scope-of-employment inquiry is not contingent on the finding of a fiduciary duty
owed by the tortfeasor to the victim. Rather, courts look more generally at the
power dynamics in the employee-third party relationship and allow the jury to
in cases involving relationships that
determine the scope-of-employment question
75
exhibit a significant imbalance of power.1
C. The Cleric-ParishionerRelationship
A power imbalance is inherent in the relationship between a cleric and a
parishioner. 176 In his role as a religious advisor and counselor, a cleric "carries the
ultimate spiritual authority, particularly in the eyes of a trusting parishioner who
looks to him for spiritual guidance and support.' 7 7 For a parishioner seeking
guidance, interaction with clergy is part of "a sacred trust, a place where parishioner
can come with the deepest wounds and vulnerabilities.' ' 178 As in the case of the
therapist-patient or police officer-detainee relationships, the power imbalance in the
priest-parishioner relationship renders it uniquely susceptible to manipulation and
172. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding
an employer vicariously liable for a psychotherapist's sexual misconduct in light of the
therapist's abuse of the transference phenomenon); Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d
344, 348-49 (Alaska 1990) (finding the scope-of-employment inquiry to be a question of fact
where a therapist abused the transference phenomenon in order to sexually assault the plaintiff);
Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1349 (Cal. 1991) (discussing the "great power

and control" police officers possess over their suspects). For a discussion of the employee-third
party relationship, see supra Part IV.A-B and accompanying footnotes.
173. See supra note 170 (noting cases that recognize the significance of the employee-third
party relationship but make no explicit finding of the existence of a fiduciary relationship).
174.

See, e.g., Doe, 791 P.2d at 348 (discussing a therapist's abuse of the transference

phenomenon and finding the scope-of-employment issue to be a question of fact).
175. See, e.g., Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1370-71 (finding the employer vicariously liable for
psychotherapist's sexual misconduct based on the patient's vulnerability); Mary M., 814 P.2d at
1349 (discussing the "great power and control" police officers possess over their suspects).
176. See Pamela Cooper-White, Soul-Stealing: PowerRelations in PastoralSexualAbuse,
108 CHRISTtAN CENTURY 196, 196 (1991) (stating that "there is an imbalance of power between
[a cleric and a parishioner] at the outset" of the relationship).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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exploitation of the vulnerable party by the dominant party. 179 Some jurisdictions
that recognize the power imbalance in the therapist-patient or police officer-detainee
contexts as being sufficient to satisfy the requisite causal nexus for the engendered
by the employment analysis have not found the priest-parishioner relationship to
possess the requisite degree of intimacy.'8 0 In Fearing,the court correctly held, in
light of sufficient pleadings, that the intimacy of the priest-parishioner relationship
satisfies the requisite causal nexus between the employment and the tortious
conduct, and that such claims require submission of the scope-of-employment
question to the jury.' 8' In fact, the parishioner's perception of divinely bestowed
powers in the priest arguably elevates the intimacy of the relationship
beyond that
82
present in the therapist-patient or police officer-detainee contexts.
1. Trust-Dependency Relationshipsand Clergy Counseling
Among the many duties of clergymen is the counseling of parishioners. 83 By
some estimates, clerics spend between twenty-five and sixty percent of their time in
face-to-face consultation s 4 The same psychological crises that lead individuals to
179. See Enderle v. Trautman, Civ. No. A3-01-22, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20181, at *15
(D.N.D. Dec. 3, 2001) (describing clergy sexual misconduct as an "egregious abuse of power
and trust by one in a special relationship with the exploited person").
180. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1986)
(distinguishing the therapist-patient relationship from other intimate relationships, including the
priest-parishioner relationship). Specifically, the court stated:
The crucial factor in the therapist-patient relationship which leads to the imposition
of legal liability for conduct which arguably is no more exploitative of a patient
than sexual involvement of a lawyer with a client, a priest or minister with a
parishioner, or a gynecologist with a patient is that lawyers, ministers and
gynecologists do not offer a course of treatment and counseling predicated upon
handling the transference phenomenon.
Id.
181. See Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Or. 1999) ("A jury reasonably could
infer that Bucher's performance of his pastoral duties.., were a necessary precursor to the
sexual abuse and that the assaults thus were a direct outgrowth of and were engendered by
conduct that was within the scope of employment.").
182. See Janice D. Villiers, Clergy MalpracticeRevisited: Liabilityfor Sexual Misconduct
in the Counseling Relationship,74 DENY. U. L. REV.1, 3 (1996) (describing sexual misconduct
in the priest-parishioner setting as being "especially contemptible because the perpetrator's
power and authority are perceived as derived from God").
183. See Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, 32 F.3d
953, 959 n.23 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting the priest's testimony that his duties included "saying
mass, hearing confessions, giving communion, anointing the sick, funerals, weddings," and
"counseling").
184. See Eduardo Cruz, When the Shepherd Preys on the Flock: Clergy Sexual
Exploitation and the Searchfor Solutions, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.499, 504 (1991) (discussing
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seek counseling from psychotherapists can often lead individuals to seek guidance
from their pastor.' 8 5 Likewise, the same issues of vulnerability arising out of the
trust-dependency associations are present in both relationships. 6 In contrast to
dicta in Simmons,187 some commentators contend that the transference phenomenon
is present in pastoral counseling just as it is in psychotherapy.18 8 Courts evaluating
respondeat superior claims grounded in clergy counseling should have the same
18 9
concern about misuse of transference and its impact on the parishioner.
Consequently, courts willing to recognize transference as providing the requisite
causal nexus for the engendered by the employment test in the psychotherapy
setting should also recognize the causal nexus of transference in the pastoral
counseling setting.
Even more fundamental than the apprehension over misuse of transference
in therapist-patient relationships are the underlying concerns of vulnerability
and the abuse of trust.19 Like the therapist-patient relationship, the clergyparishioner relationship is one that "creates trust and reliance."' 9' Discussing
concerns about the abuse of trust in pastoral counseling, one court stated:
Trust and confidence are vital to the counseling relationship between
parishioner and pastor ....
Often parishioners who seek pastoral
counseling are troubled and vulnerable. Sometimes, they turn to their
pastor in the belief that their religion is the most likely source to sustain

the recent increase in the amount of time devoted by clergy to pastoral counseling).
185. See, e.g., Villiers, supranote 182, at 3 ("During an emotional or psychological crisis,
many parishioners seek counseling from a local pastor.").
186. See Cruz, supra note 184, at 504 (stating that transference and the resulting patient
vulnerability pose the same problems in pastoral counseling as in psychotherapy).
187. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that the
priest-parishioner relationship "do[es] not offer a course of treatment and counseling predicated
upon handling of the transference phenomenon").
188. See Cruz, supranote 184, at 504 ("Although the transference phenomenon is usually
discussed in the context of psychiatrist- or psychologist-patient relationships, the same dynamics
are in effect when the clergy assumes the role of religious counselor."); Fenton, supra note 60,
at 64 ("Sexual exploitation at the time of transference ... can occur in any relationship, not just
within that of psychotherapist-patient .... ).
189. See, e.g., L.L. v. Med. Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984)
("The transference phenomenon makes it impossible that the patient will have the same
emotional response to sexual contact with the therapist that he or she would have to sexual
contact with other persons.").
190. See id. at 177 ("The first and most basic element of the doctor's charge is acting with
[a] sense of imparting trust always guiding and governing the relationship." (quoting D.
DAVIDOFF, THE MALPRACrICE OF PsYcIiATRIsTs

191.

6 (1973))).

Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 322 (Colo. 1993).
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know of the
them in their time of trouble. The pastor knows, or should
192
parishioner's trust and the pastor's dominant position.
A parishioner seeking spiritual or emotional guidance from a cleric
193
necessarily expects that the cleric will act in the parishioner's best interests.
Sexual misconduct arising out of a cleric's abuse of this trust is an outgrowth of
a cleric's legitimate duties and thus satisfies the causal nexus requirement of
the engendered by the employment test and the Fearing analysis.
2. Divine Authority and Clergy Power
In Mary M., the Supreme Court of California found it to be foreseeable
that the coercive authority possessed by a police officer could be misused to
perpetrate an assault on a third party. 94 The court limited its holding to
respondeat superior claims arising out of assault by police officers, stating that
"[e]mployees who do not have [police] authority and who commit sexual
assault may be acting outside the scope of employment as a matter of law."' 195
Yet the coercive authority possessed by clergymen is arguably more powerful
than that possessed by police officers. Police officers carry out their duties
under the authority of the state.1 96 Clergymen, in the eyes of parishioners,
derive their authority from God. 197 This perception allows a cleric to invoke
God as supporting his conduct and to compel the victim to keep the sexual
abuse confidential. 198 Just as the perception of a police officer's power is
enhanced by "visible symbols of that power .... [including] a distinctively

marked car, a uniform, a badge, and a gun,"199 the perception of a cleric's
divine power is bolstered by the clerical collar, the Bible, the cross, and other
192. F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 704 (N.J. 1997).
193. See Villiers, supra note 182, at 3 (stating that parishioners hold clergy in high regard
and expect clergy to act in their best interests).
194. See Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1350 (Cal. 1991) ("In view of
the considerable power and authority that police officers possess, it is neither startling nor
unexpected that on occasion an officer will misuse that authority by engaging in assaultive
conduct.").
195. Id. at 1350 n. 11. For a discussion of this case, see supra Part IV.B.2.
196. Id. at 1352.
197. See, e.g., Cruz, supra note 184, at 501 (stating that parishioners believe that clergy
authority comes from God).
198. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting
plaintiff's allegations that the offending priest described the sexual conduct as "special and
acceptable in the eyes of the Lord" and that "it was not something [she could] share with
others").
199. Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1349.
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visual images of God. The "Man of God" characteristic of a clergymen's
authority has been described as "one of the most insidious aspects of [clergy]
power. ,200 This unique authority is arguably more powerful than that possessed
by a police officer over detainees, and it renders misuse of clergy power to
perpetrate sexual assaults highly foreseeable. 20 1 The foreseeability of sexual
misconduct in the clergy-parishioner relationship, like that in the police officerdetainee relationship, satisfies the requisite causal nexus between the
employment relationship and the tortious conduct.
D. Respondeat SuperiorPolicy Considerationsand Clergy Sexual
Misconduct
The policy considerations underlying the doctrine of respondeat superior
strongly support its application in cases involving clergy sexual misconduct.
One such consideration is the prevention of future injuries. °2 In theory, the
stringent standard of liability imposed by respondeat superior gives employers
an incentive to exercise greater care in selecting and monitoring their
employees.2 3 In clergy sexual misconduct cases, the potential for exorbitant
jury awards against the employer-church arising out of the misconduct of an
employee-cleric surely would provide a strong motivation for religious
institutions to exercise greater care in selecting and monitoring their clerics. In
light of the numerous high-profile clergy abuse cases involving a single cleric

200.

Cooper-White, supra note 176, at 197.

201. One commentator has suggested that in the context of clergy sexual misconduct,
respondeat superior fails as a viable cause of action because "[p]roving foreseeability is nearly
impossible." Short, supra note 111, at 197. It is true that proving foreseeability in a given
respondeat superior case is difficult. In fact, where such evidence exists, the victim would likely
be able to assert several negligence-based claims in addition to or in lieu ofrespondeat superior.
But when determining whether a plaintiff states a valid respondeat superior claim, the
foreseeability inquiry is not properly directed at the specific facts of the case. Rather, the
foreseeability inquiry should instead be focused on the type of relationship-in this case, priestparishioner-and whether it exhibits a power imbalance similar to the therapist-patient or police
officer-detainee relationships such that it would warrant imposition of respondeat superior
liability. Finally, the foreseeability of clergymen abusing their job-created authority is arguably
bolstered by evidence that one in four clergymen has had some form of sexual contact with a
parishioner. Id. at 184.
202. See Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 366 (Cal. 1995)
(discussing policy considerations, including the prevention of future injuries, that should be
used as guidelines in determining whether to apply respondeat superior).
203. Tippecanoe Beverages, Inc. v. S.A. El Aguila Brewing Co., 833 F.2d 633,638 (7th
Cir. 1987).
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with multiple victims over many years, 2 04 closer supervision of clericemployees would almost certainly allow religious institutions to uncover
abusive behavior earlier and thereby prevent both further injuries and further
victims.
A second policy consideration in determining the propriety of holding
religious institutions vicariously liable for the sexual misconduct of clergymen
is the effect of the church-mandated vow of poverty. In Lisa M., the Supreme
Court of California identified the assurance of victim compensation as one of
three policy goals underlying the doctrine of respondeat superior. °5 When
religious organizations require that their clerics take a vow of poverty, the
organization effectively renders their employees judgment-proof. Some courts
have acknowledged this policy consideration when evaluating respondeat
superior claims arising out of sexual assaults perpetrated by clergy members
who have taken the vow of poverty. 2°6 Additionally, one jurisdiction using the
traditional motive-to-serve test held that a priest who has taken the vow of
poverty was arguably acting to further the interests of the church when he
committed a sexual assault during a counseling session because the vow of
poverty required the priest to turn over all counseling proceeds to the church.20 7
Although the precise judicial reasoning on the subject might vary, the policy of
ensuring victim compensation is a factor that clearly weighs in favor of holding
vicariously liable religious institutions that require their clerics to take a vow of
poverty.
A third policy goal is to spread losses equitably and, whenever possible, to
assign costs to the cheapest cost-bearer.2 °8 Beyond having deeper pockets than
typical tort victims, employers are usually able to purchase insurance to cover
damages resulting from torts, the cost of which can be absorbed as one of the
many costs of doing business. 2°9 Furthermore, assigning costs to the party that
204. See, e.g., Short, supra note 111, at 219-21 (chronicling the repeated acts of abuse
committed by Fr. John Geoghan of the Boston Archdiocese).
205. See Lisa M., 907 P.2d at 366 (discussing policy reasons behind the doctrine of
respondeat superior).
206. See, e.g., Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1077 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (stating that the
vow of poverty may be a valid consideration in determining whether it would be just to attribute
the losses resulting from the assault to the employer-church).
207. See Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 309 F. Supp. 2d 247,252 (D.
Conn. 2004) (noting that the priest "allegedly assaulted plaintiff during counseling sessions in
attempt to bring plaintiff closer to the Church and her religious faith, thereby increasing
financial donations to the Church and volunteer time spent by plaintiff and her family in
furtherance of the Church's business").
208. See Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 366 (Cal. 1995)
(discussing the benefits of cost-spreading).
209. Johnston v. Long, 181 P.2d 645, 651 (Cal. 1947).
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benefits from the employment relationship "appeals to an instinctive sense of
justice. '' 210 On the whole, this policy goal is served by holding religious
institutions vicariously liable for sexual assaults committed by clergymen.
Religious institutions may purchase liability insurance and seek indemnity from
insurance companies following adverse judgments in lawsuits.211 Additionally,
assigning the costs of the harm to the cleric's employer rather than to the victim
of the sexual
assault most certainly appeals to one's "intrinsic sense of
' 212
justice.
V. Conclusion

The epidemic of clergy sexual abuse warrants a reexamination of the
viability of respondeat superior claims asserted against hierarchical religious
institutions. One barrier to the imposition of vicarious liability on religious
organizations is the doctrine of Ecclesiastical Abstention. In light of the United
States Supreme Court decisions in Smith and City ofBoerne, however, the Free
Exercise Clause does not impede third-party tort actions grounded in neutral
and generally applicable tort law. Furthermore, the Establishment Clause and
the apprehension over excessive judicial entanglement in religious doctrine
present less of a concern for respondeat superior claims than negligence claims
because respondeat superior claims would not force courts to establish
reasonable standards of clergy conduct.

210. Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychology & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306,
314 (Minn. 1982) (Peterson, J., dissenting).
211. See Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 133 S.W.3d 887,
897 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting insurance companies' arguments that, as a matter of law,
they were not required to indemnify the church because the acts of molestation were
intentional). In Interstate, the court rejected the insurers' argument that the assaults against the
victim were not "occurrences" for purposes of the insurance policy because the assaults were
intentional. Id. at 891. The court noted that the determination of whether the abuse constituted
an "occurrence" for purposes of the policy was to be made from the point of view of the insured.
Id. at 894. Absent a finding that the abuse committed by the priest-who was not a party to the
contract-was intended by the Diocese, the court held the abuse to be an "occurrence." Id. at
895. The court also rejected the insurers' public policy argument, stating that although public
policy prohibits allowing a party to insure against his or her own intentional misconduct, the
insurers had failed to prove that the abuse was the result of the Diocese's intentional conduct.
Id. at 896.
212. See Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1353 (Cal. 1991) (stating that the
public employer must be held accountable for assault committed by policemen on duty, in part
because "'[i]t is, after all, the state which puts the officer in a position to employ force and
which benefits from its use"' (quoting Thomas v. Johnson, 295 F. Supp. 1025, 1032 (D.D.C.
1968))).
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Courts applying the traditional scope-of-employment inquiry have been
unwilling to recognize the validity of respondeat superior claims arising out of
clergy sexual misconduct because it is nearly impossible to show that sexual
assault by a cleric in any way furthers the interests of the church.213
Recognizing this difficulty in applying the traditional scope-of-employment
inquiry to any intentional torts, several jurisdictions have begun to develop
alternative tests for determining whether an act was within the scope of
employment. 14 In Fearing,the Supreme Court of Oregon set forth a workable
scope-of-employment analysis that strikes an ideal balance between the
traditional scope-of-employment test and the engendered by the employment
test. 2 15 The Fearing analysis does away with the rigidity of the traditional
scope-of-employment analysis and replaces it with a flexible test that is far
more suitable for determining whether an employee's intentional tort occurred
within the scope of employment. The "causal nexus" requirement permits
courts to reject as a matter of law claims that cannot fairly be said to have been
engendered by the employment relationship.2 16 At the same time, the Fearing
analysis prevents courts from summarily dismissing respondeat superior claims
arising out of intentionally tortious conduct merely because the commission of
the intentional tort itself did not further the interests of the employer. 217
The holding in Fearingrecognizes that the intimate relationship between a
cleric and a parishioner, when adequately pleaded, satisfies the requisite causal
nexus and that the scope-of-employment question should, in such cases,
become a question of fact for the jury. Like the therapist-patient and police
213. See, e.g., Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, 32
F.3d 953,960 (5th Cir. 1994) ("It would be hard to imagine a more difficult argument than that
[a priest's] illicit sexual pursuits were somehow related to his duties as a priest or that they in
any way furthered the interests of... his employer.").
214. See, e.g., Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 361 (Cal.
1995) (stating that California has abandoned the traditional requirement that the employee's
actions must be motivated by a desire to serve the interests of the employer); Marston, 329
N.W.2d at 309-10 ("We reject as the basis for imposing liability the arbitrary determination of
when, and at what point, ... [intentional torts] leave the sphere of the employer's business and
become motivated by personal animosity." (quoting Lange v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d
783, 785 (Minn. 1973))).
215. See Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 1167 (Or. 1999) (stating that the proper
respondeat superior inquiry in cases involving intentional torts is to determine whether conduct
"that was within the scope of his employment.., arguably resulted in the acts that caused
plaintiffs injury").
216. See id. (stating that the analysis requires "a causal connection between the acts that are
alleged to be within the scope of employment and the harm to the plaintiff").
217. See id. at 1167 (noting that it is improper when analyzing intentional torts to ask
whether the tortious act itself furthered the interests of the employer and was within the scope of
employment).
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officer-detainee relationships, the priest-parishioner relationship contains an
inherent imbalance of power. The power imbalance in the priest-parishioner
relationship is a product of the vulnerability of parishioners seeking guidance
and the coercive authority possessed by clergymen. It is this power imbalance
that renders abuse of trust and misuse of authority a foreseeable outgrowth of
the priest-parishioner relationship and establishes a causal nexus between the
employment relationship and the tortious conduct. Courts applying scope-ofemployment tests similar to the Fearinganalysis should recognize the intimacy
of the priest-parishioner relationship and should find that the power imbalance
inherent in the relationship satisfies the requisite causal nexus.
By applying the Fearinganalysis to respondeat superior claims arising out
of clergy sexual misconduct, courts will allow juries to determine whether the
cleric's actions took place within the scope of employment. The judicial
system can thereby take a significant step towards holding religious institutions
accountable for the tortious actions of their employees. Holding these
organizations vicariously liable will ensure compensation for the victims of
clergy sexual abuse, encourage increased scrutiny in clergy selection and
monitoring, and, ultimately, reduce the number of clergy sexual abuse victims.

